

ICCMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

2-L
ction

EA

fo

MR

S

P

UR

SECRET

This Document Must Be Returned to
RM/R

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2777, March 2, 3 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT
BEIRUT 311, DAM7, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 208, BAGHDAD 186
S 208, JIDDA 226, TEL AVIV 145, LONDON 527.

Re EMBTEL 2744

Following are supplemental comments re Cairo conference as seen by Embassy:

1. Conference confronted Nasser with three main problems:

(A) To counter impression Egypt being isolated from other Arab states.

(B) Whereas Eisenhower plan was an important element in general review of US-Arab relations reported by King Saud, and was obviously viewed sympathetically by Saud and Hussein, Nasser faced problem of offending Soviets by indicating approval in light:

(I) Continued dependence on Soviets for critical imports including wheat, petroleum products and markets for large part of Egyptian cotton export;

(II) Potential importance Soviet assistance if UN continued unsuccessful in efforts force Israeli withdrawal;

(III) Alternative ME plan offered by Soviets and currently being recommended by India for further consideration;

(IV) Nasser's tendency conceive American policy unalterably opposed to him and his regime and that as consequence prospects of Egypt's being able profit by Eisenhower plan about nil.

(C) In effort retain leadership in Arab world, Nasser had to demonstrate that the basic issues and policies of the Arab nations continued to be those outlined in program of his revolution,

SECRET

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

786.11/3-257

SECRET FILES

Destroyed in RM/R

Name

SECRET

-2- 2777, March 2, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Cairo

revolution, not broader issues upon which President Eisenhower and King Saud reached agreement.

2. Conference has resulted in no basic change in situation as it existed prior Saud's return Cairo.

(A) Saud believed unshaken in determination cooperate with US and awareness Soviet threat. Thus no evidence that danger to Egypt and Syria of isolation from other Arab states on these issues substantially reduced.

(B) Egypt's relations with United States and West in general will continue to be based on specific positions taken with respect each item in long list upcoming issues.

(C) Relations with Soviet bloc not basically affected. Nasser's rejection of opportunity - under cover collective Arab action - make even slight positive gesture towards West suggests that, despite his repeated assertions of desire steer middle course between East and West, he either unable or unwilling take any corrective measures to alter tack toward Soviet bloc. No question but that Nasser did effective job of convincing Saud that turning of Egypt to Soviet bloc for arms and trade was inevitable result of Western pressures rather than act of volition by Egypt.

3. Despite number important items on agenda, problem of Israeli withdrawal overshadowed all others. As this problem unresolved during course conference, and as uncertainty remained re final US position, it was foregone conclusion that regardless of other positive or negative factors no positive public position towards US would be taken.

4. Effective argument by GOE in avoiding reference to Eisenhower plan in communique was said to have been that it would be beneath dignity Arab leaders comment favorably on plan which had not yet been passed by Congress.

B1
(A)(5)

LR:LMB

SECRET

2-L

SECRET

ction

EA

ifo

MR.

S

P

UR

Control: 1361
Rec'd: March 2, 1957
3.18 p.m.

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2777, March 2, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2777, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 208, BAGHDAD 186, BEIRUT 311, DAMASCUS 208, JIDDA 204, TEL AVIV 148, LONDON 527.

1957 MAR 4 AM
MESSAGE CENTER
NEA

7. Use of term "Big Four Conference" not only presumptuous but mathematically questionable, since several of most important meetings were special sessions attended only by Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Might more appropriately have been called "three and a half conference".

8. Although it had been suggested before the conference that President Kuwatly might be developing certain pro-Western tendencies, reports of conference were to effect his conduct made that of Nasser seem moderate by comparison.

10. The final communique was a disappointment to a substantial element among the thinking people in Egypt who had hoped that the conference might somehow bring an end to the worrisome series of discords between Egypt and the US. Was also disappointment to anti-regime elements who had hoped that an open division would occur between Nasser and Saud.

11. Taking everything into consideration results of conference no cause for surprise. True that due current frontpage character of Eisenhower doctrine, idea had become current in some circles that conference would be important point of decision but any thought that conference could actually have been expected, in existing circumstances, to come out with forthright pro-Western stand could only have germinated in minds of most optimistic and not been

SECRET FILE

SECRET

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

SECRET

-2- 2777, March 2, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Cairo

and not been product of sober political judgment. It was a sorry sort of performance, not one to be assessed in terms of dramatics.

MAR 6 1957

HARE

LR:LMB

SECRET